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CONDITIONAL ZONING IN VIRGINIA
Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
Susanne L. Shilling**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Zoning ordinances in the United States are of relatively recent
origin." Local government planners were quick to recognize their
usefulness as a means of land use control,2 and over the years zoning ordinances have been developed into many varied and complex
forms. This article will focus on conditional zoning, one of the newest forms of zoning, as it exists today in Virginia. Some background on zoning in general, however, will be useful to achieve a
proper understanding of conditional zoning.
The greatest imPetus to the development of zoning in general
came as the result of a 1926 United States Supreme Court decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3 Euclid stands for the
proposition that zoning is a valid exercise of the state's police
power. 4 Since Euclid, all fifty states have enacted enabling legisla* Sole practitioner and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond;
B.A., University of Richmond, 1960; M.C., University of Richmond, 1974; J.D., University of
Richmond, 1976; Member, Henrico County Planning Commission, 1972-79.
** Sole practitioner; B.S., University of Michigan, 1966; M.S.W., University of Pennsylvania, 1968; J.D., University of Michigan, 1974; Member, Richmond City Planning
Commission.
1. The first zoning ordinance in the U.S. was adopted by New York City in July 1916. A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 1-6 (4th ed. 1981).
2. Various other types of land use controls, however, such as building set back lines, had
been evolving prior to the development of zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), in which the United States Supreme Court held that although the statutory establishment of building lines was not invalid per se, the manner in
which the setback lines were established in the City of Richmond was invalid in that it
permitted one set of property owners to control the property rights of other property owners, without the benefit of a fixed standard for the exercise of such discretionary power. The
Court stated: "[Tihe property holders who desire and have the authority to establish the
line may do so solely for their own interest, or even capriciously. Taste (for even so arbitrary
a thing as taste may control) or judgment may vary in localities, indeed in the same locality." Id. at 143-44.
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. Accord, Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). The
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tion delegating this police power to their localities, 5 although the
legislation may take either a permissive or a mandatory form. As a
result of the great influx of state legislation, almost every major
city in the United States has enacted zoning ordinances.7
In Euclid, the form of zoning at issue was that of a locality divided into zoning districts, with the land within each district subject to uniform regulation. This type of zoning became known as
"Euclidean" zoning and was used as the primary model for zoning
ordinances throughout the United States.' Yet the requirement of
uniform regulation for each district can be onerous to some landowners who wish to use their land in a manner different from that
prescribed by the zoning ordinance, and especially onerous when
that use would otherwise be beneficial to the community. In order
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held:
It is within the police power of the legislature to pass an act authorizing the councils
of cities and towns to divide their municipalities into "districts" or "zones," and to
establish building lines on the streets to which all property owners must comfort; and
such an act, if passed in the interest of the health, safety, comfort, or convenience of
the public, or for the promotion of the public welfare, when not unreasonable, is constitutional and valid.
145 Va. at 561-62, 134 S.E. at 916.

5. N.

WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE, AND THE POLICE POWER

8 (1974).

6. In Virginia, much of the land use planning legislation is permissive and not mandatory,
so that localities are not required to adopt zoning ordinances. For example, VA. CODE ANN §
15.1-446.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981) requires that every governing body adopt a comprehensive plan
by July 1, 1980, but the statute is permissive regarding the components of the comprehensive plan, stating that "[iut may include . . . a zoning ordinance and zoning district maps"
(emphasis added). VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Repl. Vol. 1981) states that "[t]he governing
body of any county or municipality may, by ordinance, classify the territory under its jurisdiction or any substantial portion thereof into [zoning] districts . . . " (emphasis added).
7. Houston, Texas is an anomaly in that it has adopted no zoning ordinance. The results
of Houston's laissez-faire attitude toward land development and control are recited in a
brief article entitled A City's Growing Pains, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1980, at 45.
8. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-488 (Repl. Vol. 1981), which provides that- "All such
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings and uses throughout each
district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts."
Yet cities may have special powers, conferred by their charters, to make exceptions to this
uniformity requirement through the issuance of use permits. For example, the Council of
the City of Richmond (which consists of nine elected members) is empowered to authorize,
by an extraordinary majority of at least six votes, the use of land, buildings and structures
in a district even though the use does not conform to the regulations and restrictions for the
district. In addition, the Council has the power to impose conditions on the use of the land
when it beconies necessary to protect the community from any detrimental effects of the
special use. RICHMOND, VA., CHARTER § 17.11 (1975); RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 32.1-1050
(1975).
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to alleviate these burdens, states have enacted enabling legislation
to provide for flexibility devices, 9 including variances 0 and special
exceptions.11
A variance, which is granted by a board of zoning appeals12 or an
9. "Ever since basic zoning and land use regulation were upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., local legislatures, administrative
bodies, and courts have been groping in the drak [sic] for ways to make the rather rigid
'Euclidean' formula more flexible and adaptable ....
" Comment, Toward a Strategy for
Utilization of Contract and ConditionalZoning, 51 J. URB. L. 94, 94 (1973).
10. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(p) (RepI. Vol. 1981), which states:
"Variance" means, in the application of a zoning ordinance, a reasonable deviation
from those provisions regulating the size or area of a lot or parcel of land, or the size,
area, bulk or location of a building structure when the strict application of the ordinance would result in unnecessary or unreasonable hardship to the property owner,
and such need for a variance would not be shared generally by other properties, and
provided such variance is not contrary to the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance, and would result in substantial justice being done.
11. Special exceptions are also referred to as conditional uses and as conditional uses by
special exception. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(i) (Repl. Vol. 1981) states: "'Special exception'
means a special use, that is a use not permitted in a particular district except by a special
use permit granted under the provisions of this chapter and any zoning ordinances adopted
herewith."
12. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495 (Repl. Vol. 1981), which provides in part:
Boards of zoning appeals shall have the following powers and duties:
(b) To authorize upon appeal or original application in specific cases such variance
from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, when,
owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions will result in unnecessary hardship; provided that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
substantial justice done, as follows:
When a property owner can show that his property was acquired in good faith and
where by reason of the exceptional narrowness, shallowness, size or shape of a specific
piece of property at the time of the effective date of the ordinance, or where by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary situation or condition of such piece of property, or of the use or development of property immediately
adjacent thereto, the strict application of the terms of the ordinance would effectively
prohibit or unreasonably restrict the use of the property or where the board is satisfied, upon the evidence heard by it, that the granting of such variance will alleviate a
clearly demonstrable hardship approaching confiscation, as distinguished from a special privilege or convenience sought by the applicant, provided that all variances shall
be in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance.
No such variance shall be authorized by the board unless it finds:
(1) That the strict application of the ordinance would produce undue hardship.
(2) That such hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the same
zoning district and the same vicinity.
(3) That the authorization of such variance will not be of substantial detriment to
adjacent property and that the character of the district will not be changed by the
granting of the variance.
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equivalent quasi-judicial body, is considered to be a constitutional
"safety valve" to the zoning ordinances as applied to specific parcels of land. 13 Examples of typical variances are those granted for
lot width or depth, road frontage, setbacks, lot size, and building
height. The burden of proof is on the applicant to demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence 14 that the literal application of
the ordinance to his or her property will result in unnecessary
hardship. The variance is, by its very nature, of limited application
in that the relief awarded to the landowner is personal in nature;
15
the zoning itself has not been changed.
Special exceptions

6

also provide a degree of flexibility to Eucli-

No such variance shall be authorized except after notice and hearing as required by
§ 15.1-431.
No variance shall be authorized unless the board finds that the condition or situation of the property concerned or the intended use of the property is not of so general
or recurring a nature as to make reasonably practicable the formulation of a general
regulation to be adopted as an amendment to the ordinance.
In authorizing a variance the board may impose such conditions regarding the location, character and other features of the proposed structure or use as it may deem
necessary to the public interest, and may require a guarantee or bond to insure that
the conditions imposed are being and will continue to be complied with.
13. The New York Court of Appeals noted that:
The object of a variance granted by the Board of Appeals in favor of property
owners suffering unnecessary hardship in the operation of a zoning law, is to afford
relief to an individual property owner laboring under restrictions to which no valid
general objection may be made. Where the property owner is unable reasonably to
use his land because of zoning restrictions, the fault may lie in the fact that the particular zoning restriction is unreasonable in its application to a certain locality, or the
oppressive result may be caused by conditions peculiar to a particular piece of land.
In the former situation, the relief is by way of direct attack upon the terms of the
ordinance. In order to prevent the oppressive operation of the zoning law in particular instances, when the zoning restrictions are otherwise generally reasonable, the
zoning laws usually create a safety valve under the control of a Board of Appeals,
which may relieve against "unnecessary hardship" in particular instances.
Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, -, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852 (1939) (citations omitted). See also
Alleghany Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Covington, 217 Va. 64, 225 S.E.2d 383 (1976).
14. Trotter v. Board of Zoning Appeals, No. F-251 (EEE) (Henrico Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1967).
See also C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA 175 (1977).
15. "No provision of § 15.1-495 shall be construed as granting any board [of zoning appeals] the power to rezone property." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(e) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
16. Rathkopf has indicated that:
The term "special exception" is a carryover from the early days of zoning; the term
"special permit" goes even farther back, being found in regulatory ordinances prior to
zoning. Because the early zoning ordinances adopted these terms, the courts ruling
upon such provisions necessarily used the language of the ordinances before them
which perpetuated the use of these terms. "Special exception" is clearly a misnomer.
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dean zoning by allowing a local governing body to establish in each
zoning district certain categories of uses other than those expressly
permitted by the zoning ordinance. These special exceptions are
not permitted as a matter of right because such uses may affect the
community adversely, unless subjected to special conditions, in
which case the special exception use may be beneficial.17 Classic
examples of special exception uses are hospitals and private recreation associations in areas zoned residential.18
Although variances and special exceptions provide some relief to
the strictures of Euclidean zoning, local governing bodies, faced
with complex land use issues and ever-increasing development
pressures, have found the limited flexibility of variances and special exceptions to be inadequate to meet their needs. As a result,
local planning bodies have been creative in developing numerous
other flexibility devices to cope with these problems. The major
devices are planned unit developments, floating zones, overlay
zones, transferable development rights, and conditional zoning.
II.

CONDITIONAL ZONING

A. Introduction
Conditional zoning is one of the most important flexibility devices to emerge in Virginia in recent years. The Virginia Code defines conditional zoning as "the allowing of reasonable conditions
governing the use of. .. property, such conditions being in addiSince the use is specifically provided for in the ordinance as one to be permitted
where the conditions legislatively prescribed are found, no exception to the ordinance
is being made.

3 RATHKOPF, supra note 1, at 41-7.
17. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
Boards of zoning appeals shall have the following powers and duties:
(f) To hear and decide applications for such special exceptions as may be authorized in the ordinance. The board may impose such conditions relating to the use for

which a permit is granted as it may deem necessary in the public interest and may
require a guarantee or bond to insure that the conditions imposed are being and will
continue to be complied with.
18. Rathkopf lists the following examples of special exceptions: "motels, churches, gasoline service stations, restaurants, quarries, senior citizen housing, fraternity houses, trucking
terminals, billiard parlors, institutional uses, schools and colleges, social service centers,
clubs, driving ranges and miniature golf courses, drive-in restaurants, day care centers, and
television transmitting towers." RATHKOPF, supra note 1, at 41-4, -5.
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tion to the regulations provided for a particular zoning district or
zone by the overall zoning ordinance." 19 Because the validity of
conditional zoning has not been addressed by the Virginia Supreme Court, a look at the statutory and case law of other jurisdictions is helpful in anticipating the issues which may be raised with
respect to conditional zoning in Virginia.
B.

The Validity of Conditional Zoning

Zoning with conditions20 has been criticized by some commentators on the basis of its similarity to contract zoning, which is illegal.21 Furthermore, many courts have ruled that zoning with condi22
tions is ultra vires, illegal, void, and contrary to public policy.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(q) (Repl. Vol. 1981). One authority has broadly defined
conditional zoning as "a zoning reclassification subject to conditions not generally applicable
to land similarly zoned. In other words, when an area of land is rezoned from one classification to another, and such change is not outright but subject to some type of condition, then
we are confronted with a conditional zoning problem." Miller, The Current Status of Conditional Zoning, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 121, 122 (1974).
20. Most courts in other states have not used consistent labels in analyzing cases in which
zoning amendments have been granted accompanied by conditions or restrictions. The authors have chosen the generic term "zoning with conditions" to refer to such zoning which
was at issue in the cases discussed in this section.

21. Compare

RATHKOPF,

supra note 1, with

ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS

(1978). Rohan notes the following distinction between "contract zoning" and "conditional
zoning." Contract zoning involves a reciprocal agreement between the landowner and the
municipality by which the owner promises to restrict the use of property in return for the
municipality's promise to allow the rezoning. Many courts hold such agreements illegal as
an ultra vires bargaining away of the local government's police power. Conditional zoning,
on the other hand, involves a situation in which the property owner covenants to perform
certain conditions, such as restricting use, dedicating land, or making physical improvements, even though the municipality makes no commitment to rezone. ROHAN, supra, at 143 n.21. See also Note, Contract and ConditionalZoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23
HASTINGS

L.J. 825 (1972).

In Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, -,
172 A.2d 40,
45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1963), a New Jersey court succinctly stated its objection to contract zoning:
The viciousness of this contract may be briefly summarized thusly:
(a) The township having adopted a master plan it could only be amended or changed
in accordance with law and not by a contract which destroys such master plan and
results in haphazard or piecemeal zoning.
(b) The defendants surrendered their inherent power, right, and duty, to keep their
zoning and planning ordinances mutable by making necessary amendments or
changes for the benefit of the public.
22. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219
Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A.2d 618 (1960); Carole
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These courts have invalidated zoning with conditions regardless of
which method has been used to impose the condition, whether they
are contained in a separate document, such as a collateral agreement or declaration of covenants,23 whether imposed as a condition
in the minutes of the proceedings or in the resolution or rezoning
ordinance, 24 or whether offered by the landowner orally or in writing as an inducement in favor of the rezoning. 25 Furthermore, these

cases fail to distinguish among the various forms of conditions
which may be imposed, such as a restriction upon the use of property26 or upon a feature of a use, 27 or a requirement that the landHighlands Citizen Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663 (1960);
Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966); Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 78
N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952); Haymon v. City of Chattanooga,
513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. 1973); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d
528 (1953); cf. City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967); Pressman v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960); Yates v. Mayor of Jackson, 244 So.
2d 724 (Miss. 1971).
23. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319
(1952); Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1963). But see Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App.
1973).
24. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164,
148 A.2d 429 (1959).
25. In Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971), the landowner's
attorney orally promised the legislative body that buildings on the parcel would conform to
design plans. The court invalidated the rezoning legislation, stating.
Rezoning on consideration of assurances that a particular tract or parcel will be developed in accordance with restricted approved plans is not a permissible ground for
placing the property in a zone where restrictions of the nature described are not otherwise required or contemplated. Rezoning must be effected by the exercise of legislative power rather than by special arrangements with the owner of a particular tract or
parcel of land.
Id. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 441. See also City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263
S.W.2d 528 (1953).
26. In Allred v. City of Raleigh, the court applied the ultra vires rationale to invalidate a
zoning amendment which would have allowed the construction of a high-rise apartment
complex in a residential area. Although the amendment would have allowed a variety of
uses, the ordinance was adopted in consideration of the one specific use and plan proposed.
The court construed the state enabling act to require that all uses permitted by a particular
zoning classification be made available to all property within the district. 277 N.C. at -,
178 S.E.2d at 440. See also Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959)
(use was restricted to that of a funeral home).
27. Haxnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (buffer); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219
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owner perform some act in connection with the rezoning, such as
dedicating a portion of the property, or a separate property, for
public purposes."8
The indiscriminate judicial condemnation of the practice of zoning with conditions in these cases appears, however, to be
grounded upon non-compliance with a basic principle which underlies all zoning practices-that in order to be a valid exercise of
the police power, the authorization to zone must be exercised in a
reasonable manner so as to secure the health, safety, and welfare of
the public and not arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or capriciously. In
none of the cases in which the court expressed blanket disapproval
of the challenged zoning was there a valid basis for the rezoning
itself, independent of any conditions. No condition associated with
illegal zoning would be upheld. Zoning with conditions, therefore,
has inadvertently been associated with invalid zoning practices as
a result of these early cases.
Church v. Town of Islip29 was the first case to abandon this rigid
analysis and hold in favor of zoning with conditions because of its
utility as a flexible response to the pressures of urbanized growth.
In Church, neighboring property owners challenged the change of
zoning of a lot in the Town of Islip from a residential to a business
use. They charged that the amendment was not in conformity with
a comprehensive plan, that it arbitrarity singled out one tract for
business zoning, and that it was illegal "contract zoning." Referring to the lower court's decision, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that "community growth pressure forcing zoning changes
negatived the idea that the Town Board's action was arbitrary or
without reason, and that there was nothing illegal about the Town
Board's subjecting the new district to uses more restricted than
customarily permitted in a business district."3 0 In upholding the
legality of the condition challenged, the court declared:
Surely these conditions were intended to be and are for the benefit
Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959) (off-street parking); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive
Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952) (set back).
28. Harnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (construction of a wall); City of Knoxville
v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953) (dedication of property for a park).
29. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
30. Id. at 257, 168 N.E.2d at 682, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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of the neighbors. Since the Town Board could have, presumably,
zoned this Bay Shore Road corner for business without any restrictions, we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation. Since the owners have accepted them, there is no one in a position to contest them. Exactly what "contract zoning" means is
unclear and there is really no New York law on the subject. All legislation "by contract" is invalid in the sense that a Legislature cannot
bargain away or sell its powers. But we deal here with actualities,
not phrases. To meet increasing needs of Suffolk County's own population explosion, and at the same time to make as gradual and as
little of an annoyance as possible the change from residence to business on the main highways, the Town Board imposes conditions.
There is nothing unconstitutional about it. Incidentally, the record
does not show any agreement in the sense that the owners made an
31
offer accepted by the board.

Although the court's analysis does not clearly distinguish zoning
with conditions from illegal contract zoning, the holding is clear
that where the rezoning is reasonable, there exists no constitutional prohibition against the imposition of reasonable conditions.
Church was the springboard for a long line of cases which upheld the practice of zoning with conditions.3 2 Significantly, in
terms of the methods by which the conditions may be legally imposed, the cases which upheld zoning with conditions are in direct
opposition to those cases which held squarely against the legality
of the practice. For example, courts have held that conditions may
be imposed by a separate writing including a declaration of restric31. Id. at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
32. See, e.g., Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972); Transamerica
Title Ins. Co. v. Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (1975) (conditional zoning upheld,
albeit specific conditions held to be invalid); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969); Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 183 S.E.2d 743
(1971); Goffinett v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357, N.E.2d 442 (1976); Arkenberg v.
City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of
Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120
N.W.2d 270 (1963); In re City of New York (Rosedale Avenue), 40 Misc. 2d 1076, 243
N.Y.S.2d 814 (1963); Longdowd Corp. v. Straight Improvement Co., 39 Misc. 2d 1005, 242
N.Y.S.2d 260 (1963); Point Lookout Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 12 A.D.2d 505, 207
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1960); Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 409 Pa. 441, 187
A.2d 549 (1963); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970);
State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
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tive covenants, 33 that they may be stated in resolutions, in the
minutes of the rezoning proceedings, or in the zoning ordinance
itself, 4 or that they may be volunteered orally or in writing by the
35
landowner.
One jurisdiction has gone so far as to approve a collateral agreement between the landowner and the municipality. In the
landmark case of State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 6 a challenge was brought to the validity of an ordinance which amended
the zoning ordinance of the City of Spokane by reclassification of
certain property from a residence zone to a business zone. At the
time the amendatory ordinance was adopted, the city entered into
a collateral or concomitant zoning agreement with the owners of
the property in the reclassified area. Subsequently, other city residential property owners brought an action to attack the validity of
the amendatory ordinance as ultra vires.37 In upholding the agreement, the court rejected as unsound the line of cases holding invalid all zoning ordinances which are amended with concomitant
agreements, stating:
We hold the better rule to be that, before deciding to amend a zoning ordinance, the city must weigh the benefits which will flow to the
public generally against the detriment, if any, to the adjacent property owners or to the public which may result therefrom. An amendment to a zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement should be
declared invalid only if it can be shown that there was no valid reason for a change and that they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and have no substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant
agreement for bargaining and sale to the highest bidder or solely for
33. See, e.g., 8 N.Y.S.2d at 254, 168 N.E.2d at 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 866. Bucholz v. City of
Omaha, 174 Neb. 852, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963) and State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46
Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970) held that a city may enforce such restrictive covenants as
a third party beneficiary.
34. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969);
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
35. Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 183 S.E.2d 743 (1971).
36. 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967). The Washington court reaffirmed the Myhre
rationale and principles of law in City of Redmond v. Kezner, 10 Wash. App. 332, 517 P.2d
625 (1973). See also Goffinett v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731
(1975), aff'd, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
37. 70 Wash. 2d at

__,

422 P.2d at 792.
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the benefit of private speculators. 3

The rules established by cases which uphold zoning with conditions are as broad as are the rules which invalidate the practice.
Thus, zoning with conditions has survived a variety of attacks
upon its legality,3 9 particularly that it (1) violates the uniformity
requirement imposed by statute, 40 and (2) constitutes "spot zon38. Id. at -_,
422 P.2d at 796. Compare Myhre and Redmond with Chrobuck v. Shohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971). In Chrobuck, a collateral agreement was
invalidated where conduct between the landowner, Atlantic-Richfield, and members of the
zoning body suggested that the rezoning was solely for the benefit of Atlantic-Richfield; the
requested commercial zoning was totally inappropriate for an area primarily used for residential and recreational purposes. The court found that the proceeding was so lacking in the
appearance of fairness as to violate the requirements of due process of law. This case is
particularly interesting when compared to cases in jurisdictions which invalidate conditional
zoning. See, e.g., Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. at 197,
172 A.2d at 40; Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. 1973). Such
comparison suggests that the potential for abuse of the rezoning process can be curtailed
without invalidating the process itself.
39. Zoning with conditions has been unsuccessfully challenged upon the ground that it
violates the principles of notice and hearing required by due process of law. Sylvania Elec.
Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962). This objection has also
been directed specifically at reverter clauses which provide that if the petitioner fails to
comply with conditions imposed on the development of the property, it will be rezoned to
its original classification. In Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969), the court adopted this negative view toward reverter clauses and yet upheld the imposition of other forms of conditions. Other courts, however, have upheld reverter clauses which implicitly require conformance to procedural requirements imposed
2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442
upon rezoning. See, e.g., Goffinett v. County of Christian, 65 Ill.
(1976). See also Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
Another line of attack on zoning with conditions involves the claim that an ordinance
which references a concomitant agreement is vague, indefinite, and uncertain in its terms.
Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972); Guhl v. Manning, 223 Ga. 796,
158 S.E.2d 230 (1967).
40. The objection that zoning with conditions violates the statutory Euclidean concept is
unsuccessful in courts which are inclined to uphold zoning with conditions, for such courts
have adopted a flexible approach to the uniformity requirements of Euclidean zoning. For
example, in Sylvania Electric Products,the Massachusetts court stated:
It is inconsequential that other areas elsewhere in the city, in, or to be put in, such a
zoning district, would not have those restrictions. Requirements of uniformity and
conformity to a plan do not mean that there must be identity of every relevant aspect
in areas given the same zoning classification.
344 Mass. at 434, 183 N.E.2d at 122. See also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) (uniformity requirement relates only to uses and is not
violated by other forms of restrictions). Cf. Pecora v. Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn. 435, 144
A.2d 48 (1958) (uniformity requirement imposed by statute relates only to buildings and
structures, not land). See generally Hunsaker, Conditional Zoning in Texas, 57 Tax. L.
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ing."'41 Neither of these objections has dissuaded the courts from
upholding the validity of zoning with conditions, 2 primarily because at the base of each of these decisions is a resounding determination that the rezoning itself, independent of the conditions, is
proper.4 3 Thus, in Arkenberg v. City of Topeka," in responding to
a claim that the proposed apartment complex was "in the wrong
place," the court carefully examined the area and determined that
the neighborhood's former character-residential with only single
family dwellings-had changed. And, in Goffinett v. County of
Christian,45 a synthetic gas production plant was located in an agricultural area after a finding that the comprehensive plan of the
locality encouraged more emphasis on industry.
Regrettably, few of the cases upholding the validity of zoning
with conditions expressly distinguish between "contract zoning"
and "conditional zoning," and the terms are often used interchangeably. 4" For example, in the case of Scrutton v. County of
REV. 829 (1979), which suggests that the requirement of uniformity should pose no problem
since by definition "interface zones" between conflicting uses are not "uniformly situated."
41. See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
Rohan defines "spot zoning" as an attempt to rezone a particular property or small group of
properties, for the benefit of an individual property owner, for use in a special way which is
different from the general pattern of zoning in the surrounding geographic area. ROHAN,
supra note 21, at 1.02 n.35. Rohan also notes that conditional zoning is not per se a form of
spot zoning since spot zoning usually involves only a small geographic area, whereas size is
not normally an issue in relation to the validity of conditional zoning. Id. at 5.01[2]. The
court in King's Mill Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Westminster, 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d
1186 (1976), identified the following as the appropriate standard for determining whether a
particular action constitutes "spot zoning": "[T]he test is whether the change in question
was made for the purpose of furthering a comprehensive zoning plan or designed merely to
relieve a particular property from the restrictions of the zoning regulations." Id. at -,
557
P.2d at 1191.
42. Although the court in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79
Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969), designated the zoning change as spot zoning, it held that the amendment was nonetheless valid, because changes in the neighborhood had created conditions
compatible with the proposed new use.
43. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y. 2d at -,
168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
44. 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966). Accord, King's Mill Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of
Westminster, 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d 1186 (1976).
45. 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
46. In Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972), the court succinctly
postulated the difference when it distinguished between "reasonable measures in light of
anticipated traffic considerations and mandatory contractual prerequisities which might
control or embarrass the legislative prerogatives of the city." Id. at -, 265 So. 2d at 567. In
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970), the court ex-
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Sacramento,4 the court used the term "conditional zoning" to apply to an agreement between the landowner and the municipality
and proceeded to declare that the term "contract zoning" has no
legal significance.4 8

Zoning with conditions has not, however, been approved without
limitations. 49 These judicial limitations relate most directly to the
form of the condition imposed upon the rezoning. It has been held,
therefore, that restrictions upon use 50 or upon the feature of a
use 51 must be reasonable and non-discriminatory and must be
designed to ameliorate the possible deleterious effects of the
52
change upon development in the surrounding area.
A constitutional question arises with respect to conditions which
require that the landowner perform an act, such as the dedication
and improvement of a portion of the property, or of separate property, for public purposes: is such a requirement a valid exercise of
the police power? Where these landowner exactions are involved,
zoning with conditions has been held valid only where the conditions are responsive to an increased demand for public services created by the proposed development. 53 This requirement was expressly found that no contract with the city existed in connection with the voluntary restrictions. It should be noted, however, that the Zupancic court also defined conditional zoning
narrowly and declared by way of dictum that such assurances were neither contract zoning
nor conditional zoning. Id. at _, 174 N.W.2d at 537-38.
47. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
48. Id. at -,
79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
49. An alternative statement of this general rule is that where the zoning is reasonable,
conditions may be imposed which are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Haas v. City of
Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972); Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421
P.2d 213 (1966); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
50. King's Mill Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Westminster, 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d 1186
(1976) (zoning contingent upon representation that property would be developed for use
exclusively as a regional shopping center); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344
Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962) (use restricted to the proposed development); State ex rel.
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970) (use restricted to bowling alley
and certain commercial uses).
51. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962)
(floor area, setback, height, buffer, signage and lighting restrictions).
52. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
53. Landowner exactions have been held valid in the following cases: Haas v. Mobile, 289
Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972) (requirement that right-of-ways be dedicated as a condition to
zoning justified to reduce traffic problems resulting from new use); Transamerica Title Ins.
Co. v. City of Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (1975) (public needs created by new
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pressly addressed in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento.
[T]he police power permits the imposition of reasonable conditions
upon the landowner's proposal. Not all conditions are valid. A grant
of public privilege may not be conditioned upon the deprivation of
constitutional protections. The police power "cannot extend beyond
the necessities of the case and be made a cloak to destroy constitutional rights as to the inviolateness of private property." An arbitrarily conceived exaction will be nullified as a disguised attempt to
take private property for public use without resort to eminent domain or as a mask for discriminatory taxation.5 '
In summary, cases which invalidate zoning with conditions do so
upon the basis of unconstitutionality (with regard to police power)
and violation of public policy. In response to these prohibitions,
cases which support the validity of zoning with conditions do so
upon the imposition of certain limitations designed to reduce the
possibility of abuse by public officials. These limitations would be
achieved by applying the following guidelines:
(1) The rezoning amendment, considered independently of the
conditions, should represent a reasonable exercise of the zoning
power;
(2) the conditions should be imposed by a method that avoids
the abrogation by the governing body of its police powers, and the
municipality should avoid a promise, or appearance of a promise,
that the rezoning will be granted or obtained in consideration of
the landowner's promise; and
(3) the promise exacted should have a reasonable relation to the
rezoning and not be solely for the purpose of effecting a collateral
benefit on behalf of the municipality.
use justified right-of-way exaction for streets); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) (dedication of property for street purposes); State ex
rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967) (dedication of land for
widening of adjacent streets).
54. 275 Cal. App. 2d at -, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (citations omitted). Accord, Transamerica
Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (1975). Note that the
standard imposed in relation to landowner exactions is significantly narrower than the rule
of reasonableness applied to restrictions on a use or on a feature of a use.
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III.

CONDITIONAL ZONING IN VIRGINIA

A. Legislative Authority for Conditional Zoning
The Constitution of Virginia empowers the General Assembly to
delegate, by general or special act, the exercise of any of its powers
to any county, city, town or other unit of government within the
State. 5 The Virginia Supreme Court has viewed the delegation of
power in this manner:
[T]he legislature may confer the police power of the State upon cities and towns located therein. The extent of this power is difficult to
define, but it is elastic and expands automatically to protect the
public against the improper use of private property to the injury of
the public interest. It must never be exercised except in a reasonable
manner and for the welfare of the public."
Virginia adheres to Dillon's Rule, which states that "municipal
corporations have only those powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential
and indispensable. 5 7 Dillon's Rule has been logically extended to a
corollary rule that the powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by
statute and are limited to those conferred expressly or by necessary implication. As a delegated power, the power to zone is therefore strictly construed in Virginia.58
Special legislation was initially enacted in Virginia to permit
conditional zoning only in counties with the urban county executive form of government-that is, only in Fairfax County. 9 Subsequent amendments to the Virginia Code permitted conditional
zoning in a city completely surrounded by Fairfax County, in a
county contiguous to Fairfax County, in a city completely sur55. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
56. Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 561, 134 S.E. 914, 916 (1926).
57. Board of Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (1975).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(a) (Rep. Vol. 1981). Testimony by James Scott, Member,

Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, indicated that between June 1975 and April 1977,
Fairfax County had processed 241 applicant-sponsored rezoning applications, of which 180,
or 75%, were adopted with conditions. Transcript of Proceedings, at a Public Hearing of the
Subcommittee of the Counties, Cities and Towns Committee of the House of Delegates,
State of Virginia 101 (July 19, 1977).
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rounded by a contiguous county, and finally, in those counties on
the Eastern Shore of Virginia.8 0
Interest in conditional zoning for other localities prompted the
Counties, Cities and Towns Committee of the House of Delegates
to hold a series of public hearings around the state in 1977. The
draft legislation which was the subject of those public hearings
would have permitted local governing bodies to impose additional
conditions on applicants for rezoning."1
Relying on the sentiments expressed in those hearings, the General Assembly in its 1978 session passed general enabling legislation to permit conditional zoning statewide. This legislation provided for the voluntary proffering of additional conditions by the
landowner, rather than the imposition of additional conditions by
the local governing body, as was suggested by the draft legislation. 2 Those jurisdictions which already had conditional zoning
under the previously enacted special legislation were not to be affected by the new legislation unless they adopted it in whole or in
part by amendment of their zoning ordinances.6 3 Futhermore, in
an unusual move, the General Assembly provided a declaration of
legislative policy and findings in the Code,6 4 apparently out of concern for providing a more stable constitutional base for the conditional zoning legislation.
A review of the Virginia statute, in comparison with the experi60. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(a) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
61. Transcript of Proceedings at a Public Hearing of the Subcommittee of the Counties,
Cities and Towns Committee of the House of Delegates, State of Virginia 90 (July 21, 1977).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.1 to -491.6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
63. 1978 VA. AcTs, ch. 320.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981) provides as follows:
It is the general policy of the Commonwealth in accordance with the provisions of
§ 15.1-489 to provide for the orderly development of land, for all purposes, through
zoning and other land development legislation. Frequently, where competing and incompatible uses conflict, traditional zoning methods and procedures are inadequate.
In these cases, more flexible and adaptable zoning methods are needed to permit differing land uses and [at]the same time to recognize effects of change. It is the purpose
of §§ 15.1-491.1 through 15.1-491.4 to provide a more flexible and adaptable zoning
method to cope with situations found in such zones through conditional zoning,
whereby a zoning reclassification may be allowed subject to certain conditions proffered by the zoning applicant for the protection of the community that are not generally applicable to land similarly zoned. The provisions of this section and the following five sections shall not be used for the purpose of discrimination in housing.
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ence of conditional zoning in other states, roeveals that the General
Assembly has incorporated provisions into the Virginia statute
which obviate many of the problems encountered in other states.
The provisions of the general enabling legislation may generally be
divided into procedural and substantive aspects. Procedurally the
zoning ordinance may provide for:
(1) The voluntary proffering65
(2) in writing
(3) by the owner
(4) of reasonable conditions66
(5) in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district
(6) as a part of a rezoning or amendment to the zoning map.
The Virginia Code specifies the following substantive prerequi67
sites for conditional zoning:
(1) the rezoning itself must give rise to the need for the conditions;6 8 (2) conditions must have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; (3) conditions must not include a cash contribution to the
county or municipality; (4) conditions shall not include mandatory
dedication of real or personal property unless specifically provided
for in Section 15.1-466(f) regarding subdivision of land; 9 (5) conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements, except pro-rata, off-site drainage and sewerage facilities payments assessed in accordance with a general sewer and
drainage improvement program; 70 (6) no condition shall be prof65. A voluntary proffer precludes any objection that the condition would render the zoning illegal as contract zoning. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
66. Reasonable conditions are required by the Church line of cases in order to validate

conditional zoning. See notes 29-38, 52 supra and accompanying text.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.2 (Repl. Vol. 1981).

68. The rezoning itself must also have a valid basis. See note 43 supra and accompanying
text.
69. The problem concerning unconstitutional taking by means of the police power would

consequently be avoided. See notes 53, 54 supra and accompanying text.
70. In the context of land subdivision, the supreme court, relying on the corollary to DilIon's Rule, held that Prince William County did not have the power to exact construction
costs for off-site highway improvements from a subdivider in Hylton Enterprises, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979). The court specifically referred to
the local governing bodies' pro-rata share assessment power under § 15.1-4660) in support
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fered which is not related to the physical operation of the property; and (7) all such'conditions shall be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan. 1
There has been considerable discussion among practitioners,
professional planners, planning commission members, and elected
officials regarding the meaning of the requirement that all conditions be in conformity with the comprehensive plan. For example,
one wonders whether a condition that the property be developed
only for professional office uses would conform to a comprehensive
plan which called for the property to be used for medium density
residential purposes, if it were argued that the inclusion of professional office uses in the neighborhood would contribute to a more
72
viable medium density residential community.
B.

Application and Enforcement

Before the enactment of conditional zoning legislation in Virginia, local governing bodies or planning commissions often deferred acting on controversial requests for rezoning to permit citizens' groups composed of those neighboring property owners who
were in opposition to the proposed change to confer with the appliof the proposition that "[t]his express authorization significantly evidences the legislative
intent that only provisions explicitly approved by the General Assembly may be included in
local subdivision ordinances." 220 Va. at 440, 258 S.E.2d at 581.
71. A "spot zoning" problem could thereby be avoided. See notes 41, 45 supra and note
72 infra and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-446.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981) is permissive in that it states that the comprehensive plan may, but is not required to, include the following: (a) a land use plan; (b) a
transportation plan; (c) a community facilities plan; (d) designation of historic and urban
renewal areas; (e) an official map; (f) a capital improvements program; (g) a subdivision
ordinance; (h) a zoning ordinance and zoning district maps.
72. An instructive Rhode Island case is Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134,
364 A.2d 1277 (1976), in which Rhode Island's conditional zoning statute, which permits the
imposition of conditions on zoning by the local government body, was upheld. The court
stated: "The rule is that the amendment is required to conform to the comprehensive plan
of zoning in effect in the community.... [T]he meaning of a comprehensive plan for purposes of [the statute] is only that the ordinance bear a reasonable relationship to the public
health, safety and welfare." Id. at -,
364 A.2d at 1287 (citations omitted). In finding that
imposing differing conditions on property in the same land use classification was not an
arbitrary differentiation per se, the court noted that "where it has not been shown that a
'fundamental right' has been affected or that legislation sets up a 'suspect classification,' a
statute will be invalidated on equal protection grounds only if the classification bears no
reasonable relationship to the public health, safety or welfare." Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 1288.
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cant. The usual result of such meetings would be restrictive covenants, which would be recorded in the land records after the rezoning was granted. If violations of the covenants occurred,
enforcement rested with the parties to the covenants, while the local governing body was legally justified in keeping out of the dispute. The citizen parties often found the costs of enforcement to
be prohibitive, even though customarily such covenants provide
that the losing party pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees and
costs.
The 1978 general enabling legislation for conditional zoning now
permits the zoning administrator for the local governing body to
administer and enforce the conditions attached to the zoning
through such legal actions as injunction, abatement or other appropriate action or proceeding, and also to require a guarantee in sufficient amount for the construction of any physical improvements
required by the conditions." Thus, the costs of enforcement are
effectively shifted to a "deeper pocket" which may have the resources and technical expertise lacked by citizen groups. In terms
of the relative permanence of the conditions, however, the possibility exists that the local governing body will change the conditions
by amending the zoning ordinance, 4 whereas restrictive covenants
usually remain in effect for a specified period as negotiated by the
parties.
The zoning administrator is also required to maintain a Conditional Zoning Index, as well as appropriate annotations on the zoning maps to show the existence of conditions on specific rezonings.75 Lack of knowledge about conditional zoning and the

Conditional Zoning Index obviously presents a dangerous trap for
the unwary title attorney who may discover, much to his chagrin,
that property zoned commercial, for example, is substantially restricted regarding the commercial purposes for which it may be
used.
In the event that a zoning applicant is aggrieved by the decision
of the zoning administrator under Section 15.1-491.3, he or she
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.3 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.4 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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may petition the local governing body for review of the decision.

6

C. Future Use of ConditionalZoning in Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court has only peripherally addressed the
issue of conditional zoning. In the case of Town of Vienna Council
v. Kohler," the Court held that there was no legal impediment to
the Vienna Council considering the written proffer of a zoning applicant under the special legislation referred to above. Yet, because
Dillon's Rule and its corollary are still strong in Virginia, one can
reasonably anticipate that the Virginia Supreme Court will narrowly view this holding and any future conditional zoning litigation
with an eye to the legislation enacted; a local governing board must
act within its statutory power to fix zoning ordinances.
Any of the avenues of attack on conditional zoning mentioned in
the preceding review of cases could be raised in Virginia when appropriate. The general enabling legislation, however, appears to
have addressed those issues effectively. In addition, a 1981 Virginia
Supreme Court case, Board of Supervisors v. International Funeral Services, Inc.,78 although not specifically dealing with conditional zoning, shored up the presumption of validity of a legislative
act by a local governing body. Further, the court interprets an aggrieved zoning applicant's burden of proof to be so weighty that, in
the future, overturning the decision of a local governing body in a
Virginia zoning case will be possible only in the most extreme
situations. 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

Conditional zoning provides localities with one of the most effective flexibility devices provided to date for resolving the conflicts
inherent in a land use system, whose effectiveness must, by its very
nature, depend upon the balancing of conflicting individual property rights and public interests. Through its general enabling legislation the General Assembly has provided the means; it is now up
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.5 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
77. 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542 (1978).
78. 221 Va. 840, 275 S.E.2d 586 (1981). See generally Comment, Challenging Rezoning in
Virginia, 15 U. RICH L. REv. 423 (1981).
79. 221 Va. at 843, 275 S.E.2d at 588.
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to the local governing bodies of Virginia to use it to achieve the
ends desired.
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